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SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR'S TWO BODIES
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTHENTICITY
To describe an ontology of the body that does not involve
dualism, some reductionist form of materialism, or the view that
experience of one' s body is fundamentally a matter of interpretation, is
no mean feat. It requires balancing in one unified project seemingly
antithetical features of experience- activity and passivity, volition and
given constraints. When such an analysis is also able to provide a
ground for acute existential, psychological, and sociological
observations about the experience of women, authentic and otherwise,
this feat becomes all the more remarkable. In what follows, I will show
how admirably Simone de Beauvoir succeeds in this in The Second Sex.
In the critical literature, on one end of the spectrum one finds
those commentators who claim that Beauvoir considers the body a
biological organism, whose structure and physiology determine
women's behavior. 1 lulie Ward has shown why such views are
unwarranted; she and critics such as ludith Butler hold instead that
Beauvoir's operative sense of the term "body" is one in which the
anatomical and physiological organism, Le., the physical body, is
experienced or interpreted in terms of prevailing social and economic
conditions. Reading Beauvoir as saying that the physical body does
exert definite constraints on human experience (Ward, "Beauvoir' s Two
Senses" 239), Ward equates this body with the "Cartesian res extensa,
extended matter lacking all thought" whereas Beauvoir's "second sense
[ofthe term 'body'] presupposes thought and consciousness, and so, is
anti-Cartesian" (Ward 231-232). By contrast, Butler takes the more
radical view that in The Second Sex even gender is an interpretation or
cultural construction (Butler 255-256).
Although I am more sympathetic to the approach of Ward and
Butler than to the first group of critics, it seems to me that they too miss
something important about Beauvoir' s analysis. The passivity of the
body, an inherent part of lived experience that is both positive and
negative, is not something that can or should be interpreted away.
Concomitantly, Beauvoir does not so much react to Cartesianism as
work from a view of embodied consciousness developed by Max
Scheler, which provides the ground for the type of unified project
1 See, for example, Okley and Siegfried.
mentioned above':~ For Beauvoir, I shall argue, the individual is not
only not interpretatively free from the constraints of the body qua
physical entity, but in human experience there is always also a constant
and necessary interplay between the body as active and passive. Let us
begin then with a seemingly different type of claim in a passage from
The Second Sex that does reject the so-called balanced (heterosexual)
couple as a utopian ideae:
[I]n comradeship, pleasure, trust, tendemess, cooperation, love
[the relations between a man and a wonlan] can be for each
other the most abundant source of joy, richness and power
available to human beings. (TSS 536/11 235)4
Rather than forming a closed unit, both members of such a partnership
should be free and independent: "the individual should as such be
integrated into a society at the heart of which s/he ... could flourish
without aid" (TSS 535/11 324). Beauvoir therefore is intrigued with
Stendhal's account of a genuine male-female relationship:
Two separate beings, in different circumstances, face to face in
freedom and seeking justification of their existence through
one another, will always live an adventure full of risk and
promise. (TSS 280/1 388-389)
2 I have discussed Scheler's views in Mirvish, "Merleau-Ponty."
Important differences notwithstanding, Beauvoir, Sartre, and
Merleau-Ponty all benefitted tremendously from this aspect of
Scheler's work. For Sartre and Scheler, see Mirvish, "Sartre."
3 Beauvoir, Le deuxieme sexe, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1999) 325. See
also, Beauvoir, The Second Sex 535. Henceforth TSS. I have made
some changes in the translation that I have marked by adding TA to
the quotation. For convenience, I am citing the English version
before the French text. Volumes 1 and 2 of the French edition are
denoted by "I" and "lI" respectively.
4 It could be argued that what de Beauvoir has to say in this context
about the ideal couple also applies in principle to a union of partners of
the same sex. For Beauvoir on lesbianism, see Ward, "Reciprocity."
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She remarks that Stendhal is a feminist and a romantic at one and the
same time and clearly endorses his view that the woman's value lies
precisely in the fact that she is a free human being-"Woman ... is
simply a human being: nor could any shape of dreams be more
enrapturing" (TSS 280/1 389)- while rejecting the idea that each
member of the couple seek his or her raison d'etre through the
existence of the other: "more rare are those who are at once lovers and
friends but do not seek in each other their sole reasons for living" (TSS
536/11 325).
Beauvoir absolutely insists on the necessity for each partner in
a relationship to remain independent, emphasizing that the "ideal
[relation] would be for entirely self-sufficient human beings to form
unions with one another only in accordance with the free consent of
their love" (TSS 527-528/11 311). But why this stress on the ideal of
complete self-sufficiency? Could it not rather be argued that such
partners are profoundly interdependent insofar as each helps the other
grow and develop? In fact, some psychoanalytic theories consider
complete self-sufficiency a neurotic notion, a form of false pride that
masks a fear of intimacy.5 Why then Beauvoir's insistence on self-
sufficiency in the case of the ideal, balanced couple, and what exactly is
the relation between this self-sufficiency and authenticity?
It seems to me that what is at issue has as much to do with a
distinction between the body as active and the body as passive as with
issues offreedom and responsibility. We must therefore closely
examine what Beauvoir writes in The Second Sex about the Leib-the
active, lived body-as opposed to the Körper-the body as passive and
an object for the Other.6 Emphasizing this difference in the context of
women's experience will, in turn, enable us to answer the questions
raised above.
5 See Horney.
6Differences between Beauvoir and Sartre notwithstanding, there are
also profound similarities. I have discussed Sartre on the lived body in
the following articles: "Sartre on Friendship," "Sartre and Kohut:
Existential and Self-Psychological Approaches to the Phenomenon of
Conflict,''1 "Sartre and the Problem of Other (Embodied) Minds,"
"Sartre: The Ontology of Interpersonal Relations, Authenticity and
Childhood," and "Sartre, Hodological Space and Others."
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When it comes to the lived body, Beauvoir stresses the need to
get beyond the myth of woman as essentially passive flesh. The female,
according to her, "is not merely a carnal object; and the flesh is clothed
in special significance for each person and for each experience" (TSS
288/1 398). In other words, one does not act in the world as a mind or
spirit that animates a mechanical body but rather as a holistic being, an
intentional consciousness that is necessarily embodied: I act on my
projects as a lived body, and the way such behavior is idiosyncratically
expressed shows how "the flesh is clothed in special significance for
each person and for each experience."
Thus when Beauvoir writes that "[fleminine charm demands
that transcendence, degraded into immanence, appear no longer as
anytbing more than a subtle quivering of the flesh" (TSS 761/11 604),
she means that for the woman to be attractive or charming in the
traditional sense, man as the Other not only must see her as Körper
rather than as Leib, but she herself also must experience herself as such.
Hence Ward's earlier distinction between the lived body and the
physical body-as "Cartesian res extensa, extended matter lacking all
thought"- is too neat: the experience of the body as passive and object
is precisely an inherent, negative aspect of woman' s traditional
experience.7 Intellectual women, to the extent that they buy even
partially into an objectifying view of themselves, face the problem of
consciously having to degrade and deny their ontological bodily status,
a situation that is always doomed to failure:
[O]ne cannot by sheer will dull one's glance and change one's
eyes into sky-blue pools; one does not infallibly stop the surge
of a body that is straining toward the world in order to change
it into astatue animated by vague tremors. (TSS 761/11 604)
Moreover, trying to be an object makes one self-conscious; the
individual's actions become false, excessively deliberate, and at least
somewhat mechanical. In short, the woman in tbis case has to place
severe constraints on her body qua Leib in order to try to act as Körper.
"Woman," Beauvoir writes,
7Even if the subject enjoys and is flattered by being an attractive object
for the Other, tbis experience ultimately undennines her capacity for
transparent action in the world, as will be explained.
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remains dominated, sUITounded, by the male universe [;] she
lacks the audacity to break through its ceiling ... What woman
essentially lacks today for doing great things is forgetfulness of
herself; but to forget oneself it is first of all necessary to be
firmly assured that here and now one has found oneself. (TSS
780-781/11 625)
This suggests that woman is being held back to the extent that she
remains Körper for man as the Other. By contrast, to be unfettered and
live fully demands that instead of having her identity depend on being
seen, the subject is actively involved in the world on the basis of a
corporeal transparency. Qua Leib she accepts the body and its
constraints. Engaged and involved with projects that transcend a
primary concern with her image or appearance, she so turns the body
into an instrument for the realization of her projects. Unlike the
fixation on her own body as figure, which occurs when she is object for
the Other, transparency as a Leib implies that bodily self-awareness can
establish the ground for woman' s experiencing herself as subject.8 For
such an individual being an object for the look no longer constitutes a
major issue. This is why Beauvoir writes that the authentic woman is at
one with, rather than moves against, hthe surge of body that is straining
toward the world."
Given our cultural heritage, it remains extraordinarily difficult
for women to transcend a view of themselves as being essentially
Körper. Among other obstacles, they have to shake free of myths
perpetuated by writers who insist on seeing "woman asflesh," relate
her to "nature," and describe her as its incamation (TSS 280-281/1
389).9 Traditionally "flesh" is hypostatized to become a Körper. As
Beauvoir notes, from the woman' s own point of view pregnancy can be
a temptation to conclude essentially the same:
81 think that a similar point can be made for Sartre. I have discussed
this issue in "Gestalt Mechanisms and Believing Beliefs: Sartre' s
Analysis of the Phenomenon of Bad Faith," and "Sartre: Reciprocity,
Sexuality and Solipsism."
9 "Nature" is being used here in a pejorative sense although, as I show
later, Beauvoir also uses this idea in a positive fashion.
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[I]n gestation [life] appears as ereative; but that is astrange
kind of ereation whieh is aeeomplished in a eontingent and
passive manner. There are women who enjoy the pleasures of
pregnaney and suekling so mueh that they desire their
indefinite repetitions ... [but they] are not so mueh mothers as
fertile organisms. (TSS 553/11 350)
Vis-a-vis the issue of being a good mother, the real challenge
is not the physiological production of the baby but rather its upbringing
and thus the relation the mother as a subjeet adopts to her ehild as
subjeet or object, a relation between two lived bodies that will emeially
shape how the latter develops as a person in his or her own right. This
is vastly different from pregnancy, where the fetus remains functionally
a Körper. lO
In light of the above, what does it mean to be authentie? In
terms of the lived body, it means to behave in a transparent fashion, as
deseribed above. On the other hand, Beauvoir also writes that a woman
with
responsibilities, who knows how harsh the world's oppression
is, needs like the male not only to satisfy her physical desires
but also to enjoy the relaxation and diversion provided by
agreeable sexual adventures. (TSS 763/11 606)
The pieture here is different from the one involving transpareney, for
instead of bodily self-awareness being situated in the ground of her
experience, the subjeet now beeomes aware of her own body and that of
the Other as a conjoint figure. It is a shift from the world at large to a
lOClearly a good mother during pregnancy needs to take eare of herself
and the developing baby as Körper, but this implies that she acts on
herself as Leib. I sometimes teach a course on Medical Ethics and in
the process of presenting hoth sides of the abortion issue show the
Pro-Life video "Ultrasound: Windows to the Womb." This
production relies on ultrasound pictures to try to show that after only
one month the fetus is, in effect, a lived hody. The vast majority of
students do not huy this (literal) picture. They make the point, surely
with justification, that at earlier stages the fetus' hehavior is
instinctual, which is to say, the behavior of a Körper.
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world involving the reciprocal interaction of two lived bodies. When
such "sexual adventures" are neither masochistic nor sadistic for either
partner, neither will experience the other' s body as Körper. There will
be no need for objectification.11 Rather, the sexual act here involves
desire and a striving for mutual pleasure. The body, in other words,
figures as an active agent. However, at one and the same time the body
also remains passive to the extent that one becomes passionate, for
passion entails consciousness becoming absorbed with the flesh as such.
Experientially, it makes for a zoom-like effect, an awareness of flesh-
one's own and the other's- as overwhelming figure. Were this-state to
last, existence would become reduced and object-like; the desire of
wanting to satisfy the other's pleasure would have no place and
disappear. Genuine sexual reciprocity thus demands the interaction of
two lived bodies, which explains why Beauvoir writes that if men
"would be willing to love an equal instead of a slave ... women would
not be haunted as they are by a concern for their femininity; they would
gain in naturalness, in simplicity" (TSS 762/11 605). She also
emphasizes "the same is true of affection as of physicallove. For it to
be genuine, authentic, it must first of all be free" (TSS 528/11 312). In
an authentic sexual relation, then, each partner acts out of freedom,
which especially in the woman's case means acting outside the socially
imposed constraints that would objectify her. Each partner expresses
desire for the other and for himlherself in terms of the lived body.
Thus, as regards one's existence as an incamate being, an
authentic woman for Beauvoir is active in the world and corporeally
transparent: she neither sees nor experiences herself as an objecl.
Moreover, she expresses herself freely as a lived body also in her
sexuality. Traditional male-female relationships certainly preclude this
situation:
When woman is given over to man as his property, he
demands that in her the flesh is given simply as facticity. Her
body is not grasped as the radiation of a being as subject, but
as a thing mired in its own immanence; it is not for such a
body to ... be the promise of something other than itself. (TSS
178/1 264)12
11A similar point can be made for Sartre. See Mirvish (1994).
12 This is why Butler is too naIve in her claim that as embodied
consciousness some women can choose their gender. Certainly in
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The intellectual woman who in a still male-dominated universe tries all
the harder to prove herself, is saddled by similar difficulties: Hshe
resembles those actors who fail to feel the emotion that would relax
certain muscles and so by an [artificial] effort of will contract the
opposing ones" (TSS 762/11 604).
How are we to understand the genesis of authenticity in
woman as an embodied consciousness? According to Beauvoir, an
adolescent girl may find a haven Hin the fields and the woods" (TSS
406/11 137). In this period of her life, the societal constraints that weigh
on her as a woman-to-be are already so pervasive13 that it is only in
nature that
[e]xistence is not only an abstract destiny set down in city
records; it is the rich, fleshly future. To have a body no longer
seems a blemish to be ashamed of ... The flesh is ... joy and
beauty ... an organism rooted in the soil ... she is at once spirit
and life. (TSS 407/11 138)
The adolescent girl feels sheer exuberance in the physicality of
the body qua Leib as opposed to existence qua Körper. As an
incarnated consciousness she can savor an adult, embodied future-as
an accomplished athlete, for instance, or as sexually involved with
others. Her joy in her body in effect marks a moment of respite for, as
Beauvoir notes, in this very period her mother "saddles the child with
her own destiny: a way of proudly laying claim to her own femininity
and also a way of revenging herself for it" (TSS 317/11 31). In other
Mghanistan under the Taliban or even in less extreme Iran, there was
no viable sense in which a woman may choose her gender.
13 Beauvoir stresses the role of the mother as the one who insists that
the young girl rigidly conform to accepted societal standards. It may be
argued, however, that this phenomenon has relaxed considerably so that
the point is dated. On the other hand, consider peer pressure, which
comes not only from actual peers, but also from magazines, TV and
films. All of these factors attempt to enforce a standard of conformity
that obviously includes bodily behavior. Furthermore, high heels,
make-up, and the need to appear attractive, among many other
objectifying features, certainly suggest that the contemporary young girl
is still being constrained qua lived body. In fact, one could even say
that often she is condemned to live alienated from her body as natural
and transparent.
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words, as the girl moves into adolescence and starts to become a
woman, the mother' s own conflicts, her resentment at having been
socially feminized at the price of renouncing spontaneity, come to the
fore. Even if she is genuinely concerned with her daughter' s happiness
and welfare and sufficiently reflective so as not to project her conflicts
onto the young woman, she still "will as a rule think it wiser to make a
'true woman' ofher [daughter], since in this way society will most
easily accept her" (TSS 317/11 31). That nature allows the adolescent
girl to experience her body as "joy and beauty" provides only
momentary respite from the normally incessant flurry of constraining
and persistent socialization. 14
Where does this experience come from? What is there in the
life of the young girl, prior to adolescence, that later will allow her to
feeI the thrill and joy of her incamated consciousness as mirrored in
nature? Beauvoir insists that as a physical being or, more accurately, as
an embodied consciousness, the young girl exhibits a natural
spontaneity that has to be deliberately suppressed by societal sanction.
For example, in order to even walk in the socially appropriate fashion
she must learn to obey a set of bodily conventions that are not
necessarily in accord with the way in which she would naturally be
inclined to move: "to develop grace she must repress her spontaneous
movements" (TSS 317/1 31-32). In fact, Beauvoir goes so far as to
claim that "[h]er spontaneous surge towards life, her enjoyment of
playing, laughing, adventure, lead the little girl to view the maternal
sphere as narrow and stifling" (TSS 331/11 48). The little girl' s
existence qua lived body lets her experience herself as "an autonomous
individual" (TSS 367/11 89).
Other physical and developmental features also promote the
girl' s sense of autonomy and independence. Thus we learn that:
Up to the age of twelve the little girl is as sturdyas her
brothers, and she shows the same mental powers; there is no
14In contemporary terms, even swimming or running, to say nothing of
team sports, demand conformity to social norms, which is why
Beauvoir is correct in stressing nature as both a mirror and catalyst
that allows the adolescent an initial, tangible experience of herself as
a mature, physical being outside social constraints.
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field where she is debarred from engaging in rivalry with them.
(TSS 302/11 14)
This is not to argue that the girl is provided the same license as the boy
to follow her transcendent inclinations, which is to say her inclination
as an embodied consciousness joyously to explore and take on the
world. However, the fact that prior to the development of secondary
sexual characteristics there is on average no marked difference in
strength between the sexes and the fact that the main onslaught of
feminization by authority figures and peers occurs only with the onset
of puberty, allow the young girl to act relatively unrestricted in
consonance with her natural, physical, and mental abilities. She
functions naturallyon a par with boYS.15
The young girl' s spontaneity, then, is not that of an essentially
disembodied mind or res cogitans. Instead, it is the spontaneity of the
lived body, or rather spontaneity as a lived body, that allows the child
to break through or transcend the constraints and sanctions of an all too
pervasive feminization. Concomitantly, the strength she displays is not
a phenomenon that can be calculated in mechanical terms, i.e., purely as
a function of the Körper. To the contrary, it is inseparable from the
natural grace and spontaneity that the young girl displays in behaving as
Leib. In fact it can be said that for Beauvoir, who certainly is no
dualist, the young girl qua lived body literally incarnates a fusion of
physicality and spirit.
But there is a tension between Beauvoir's insistence that the
spontaneity and strength ofthe girl's lived body can surmount
socialization and the stress she places on socialization's pervasive power.
In elaborating on this, Beauvoir describes two major forms of separation
and consequent anxiety boys and girls experience. The first attends
weaning, as the child must cope with a profound sense of abandonment-
an experience that is partially mitigated by close physical contact with
parents and through looks of love. In what amounts to a second weaning,
however, a sharp distinction is drawn between girls and boys. As the
mother withdraws her previously lavish caresses, she does so unequally,
withholding more from her son than her daughter:
15Beauvoir writes that: "[I]f, well before puberty ... [the girl] seems... to
be already sexually determined, this is not because mysterious instincts
directly doom her to passivity, coquetry ... it is because ... the influence
of others upon the child is a factor almost from the start." (TSS 302)
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[the little girl] continues to be cajoled, she is allowed to cling
to her mother's skirts, her father takes her on bis knees and
strokes her hair. She wears sweet little dresses, her tears and
caprices are viewed indulgently .. people are amused at her
expressions ... bodily contacts and agreeable glances protect
her against the anguish of solitude. (TSS 305/11 17)
The boy, on the other hand, is denied such close physical intimacy. He
suffers censure or castigation unless he affirms and asserts his
separation, and thus bis relative independence, from others as a lived
body: "He is told that 'a man doesn't ask to be kissed ... A man doesn't
look at hirnself in mirrors ... A man doesn't cry'" (TSS 305/11 17).
Meanwhile the girl's coddling, pampering, and dressing up help create
an idealized view of self that renders her essentially passive and
objectified:
By means of compliments and scoldings, through images and
words, she leams the meanings of the terms pretty and homely;
she soon leams that in order to be pleasing she must be 'pretty
as a picture' ... she puts on fancy clothes, she studies herself in
a mirror, she compares herself with princesses and fairies.
(TSS 314/II 28)
The boy' s idealized self-image, in contrast, mandates that he assert bis
freedom, express free movement, and apprehend bis body as a means to
dominate nature (TSS 315/11 29).
As a third difference, Beauvoir discusses the significance for
girls of anatomical distinctions by citing the work of, among others,
Alice Balint, Helene Deutsch, Havelock Ellis, and Karen Horney.
Against Freud she notes that society places a distinct value on the boy' s
penis as compensation for bis more extreme form of second weaning.
Because the penis is external and anatomically distinct, the boy can
project on it the sense of a valued alter ego. The little girl-if left to
mature naturally- in turn concludes that "her body is, for her, quite
complete" (TSS 307/11 19). In other words, there is no automatic
experience of penis envy. In fact, the little girl may remain ignorant
and oblivious of any genital distinction or find this "outgrowth" (TSS
307/11 20) odd or unnatural.
With the onset of the cbild' s fascination with excretion, a stage
that has profound psychoanalytic ramifications for future development,
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the now obvious genital distinction may become significant for the girl.
But even if she regards the male organ as more convenient or as
allowing for more independent physical manipulation, even if she does
attempt to imitate the boy's behavior in urinating so that ultimately the
"possession of a male sex organ [seems] desirable to many girls" (TSS
309/11 22), the male "privilege" of having a penis" is one whose value
naturally decreases when the child loses interest in its excretory
functions" (TSS 315/11 28).
Obdurate social pressure, however, often makes the girllearn
to accept the masculine as superior, as when for example adults offer
her a doll as a substitute for the penis she lacks and as an equivalent
alter ego (TSS 313-314/11 27-28). Whereas the boy's self-image is
being proudly extemalized via his sexualorgan, Beauvoir argues, the
girl's doll-dressed up, coddled, and pampered-functions as a mirror
that fosters a narcissistic and, more generally, passive self-image in the
girl (TSS 315/11 28-29).
Given all of these socially imposed differences, can one still
maintain the young subject' s ability truly to experience the natural joy
and exuberance of her lived body? Beauvoir does indeed think so. All
the restrictions and constraints to the contrary, she writes, it
happen[s] occasionally, when the young girl is given a boyish
bringing up; in this case she is spared many problems ... tbis is
the kind of education a father prefers to give bis daughter; and
women brought up under male guidance very largely escape
the defects of femininity. (TSS 316/1130)
But when it comes to the connections between these three
stages, the first two by no means ought to be considered the sole or
necessary conditions for the last. 16 Nonetheless we have an extended
16An interesting question that goes beyond the scope of tbis article is
whether an adult who was denied the experience of the earlier two
stages, in any viable guise whatsoever, could nonetheless become an
authentic individual as defined above. Given Beauvoir' s existential
emphasis, one may be led to think that this would be possible for a
subject with sufficient insight and effort. However, what we have
seen above is that one' s past is literally impressed upon one as a
lived body. So although it may be feasible for the mature woman
intellectually to recognize and accept what it means to live
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paradigm here that explains what it means for an adult woman to act
authentically vis-a-vis the lived body: she will express herself freely as
a sexual being; she will also experience her body as transparent by
actively attending to projects in the world, an ability that sterns from her
being used to experiencing-both as an adolescent and as a young
girl- the natural spontaneity and exuberance associated with her body.
To return for a moment to the young child and the difficulty he
or she experiences during and after weaning, the feeling of vulnerability
and abandonment on being cast out from intimate physical contact with
the parent. Beauvoir fills in this picture further when she writes that
this young person" never succeeds in abolishing his separate ego" (TSS
303/11 15), although he "would fain lose hirnself in the bosom of the
Whole [which is at] ... the origin of his cosmic and pantheistic dreams,
his longing for oblivion, for sleep, for ecstasy" (TSS 303/11 15). This
point needs to be understood ontologically: after a first weaning, the
child has leamt to delineate and experience the world as a lived body
that is individuated precisely insofar as it is singular, i.e., apart from
others and to this extent alone. At this stage the young and now for the
first time truly singular subject discovers "in camal fonn ... finiteness,
solitude, desertion in astrange world" (TSS 3031I1 15). In
psychological and psychoanalytic literature, this experience is taken to
be prototypical for childhood. 17 By contrast, Beauvoir shows us that in
order to be authentic the adult essentially must replay this same
phenomenon over and over:
Art, literature, philosophy, are attempts to found the world
anew on a human liberty; that of the creator ... one must first
emerge from [the struggle to find one' s place in the world] into
a sovereign solitude if one wants to try to regain a grasp upon
it. (TSS 791/11 637)
authentically vis-a-vis her body, to be able to act in consonance with
such theoretical demands when there is no genuine, earlier basis of
incamated exuberance and spontaneity would be a very difficult task
indeed.
17Lissa Rechtin and I have discussed this issue in Mirvish and Rechtin
(1998).
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Why "sovereign solitude"? For a woman the answer here is
both psyeho-soeiologieal and existential. It has been emphasized how
insidious soeiety and the status quo are when it comes to the eonstraints
of feminization. Thus as an adult the female subjeet has to be
espeeially vigilant in maintaining her independenee from any others
who in whatever guise would tend to objeetify her. If the subjeet is to
aeeept responsibility as the free ereator and arbiter of her own aetions,
she must maintain this "sovereign solitude. In fact, women have to
wean themselves from their objeet status: "what woman needs first of
all is to undertake, in anguish and pride, her apprentieeship in
abandonment and transeendenee" (TSS 791/11 637).
But what about women working with eaeh other? Are
abandonment and solitude neeessary then? Beyond the psychologieal,
soeiologieal, and existential, there is for Beauvoir an ontologieal faetor
that ties authentieity to separateness, for in the same way that the
toddler being weaned has to learn to delineate and experienee the
world as a singular lived body, the mature woman must learn to
pereeive, experienee, and eonstitute the world from the perspeetive of
her singular embodied eonseiousness. To stand as a distinet, singular
being may certainly provoke anxiety. Hence the tendency in many
women to act as though one is somehow eonjoined to others and
literally depends on one' s being in their close presenee. Yet to behave
authentically, the subjeet must aeeept 'that as a lived body she is always
distinct and apart from others~ intimacy-whether it be in the form of
solidarity, love, or eomfort- cannot be won by denying one's
uniqueness and separation as an embodied existent. To repeat my
earlier point, it is qua lived body that one acts on one's projects, and the
way such behavior is expressed idiosyncratieally shows that "the flesh
is elothed in special signifieance for eaeh person and for each
experience."
This point ean be further emphasized by.noting that for
Beauvoir authentie individuation is not primarily a funetion of a future
in which-a La Heidegger-death serves as our "ownmost possibility."
Instead the future is grounded in the lived body and to this extent what
authentically individuates one is also the past as it is instantiated in
one's bodily aetions. These actions may indeed be soeial, and thus
eommon to a particular group or eulture, and they may even dictate
general types of responses. However, to be authentie one must aeeept
responsibility for behavior that is uniquely shaped at any moment by
virtue of one's neeessary separation from the world and others. In sum,
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as a speeifie existent or lived body I aet in speeifie eireumstanees so
that it is not an aeeeptanee of death that serves as the ultimate arbiter of
the authentieity of my aetions but rather life, emeially manifest in the
assumption of my radieal separation from others.
Indeed, to tbis extent for Beauvoir there are in fact three
weanings for the authentie individual. Two in ebildhood and another in
adult life where there is a eonstant need to see oneself qua ineamated
eonseiousness as a unique and embodied existent. If tbis applies in
general, it does espeeially in the ease of women, who-as we have
seen-are made partieularly vulnerable to the temptation of denying
their separateness and capacity for transeendenee.
California State University - Chieo Adrian Mirvish
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